Foreign-experienced CEOs and firm cash holdings

https://doi.org/10.31130/ud-jst.2025.23(10A).367E

Tóm tắt: 32 | PDF: 13

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Author

  • Nguyen Thanh Huong
    The University of Danang - University of Economics, Vietnam

Từ khóa:

Kinh nghiệm quốc tế của CEO
nắm giữ tiền mặt
Việt Nam

Tóm tắt

Nghiên cứu này xem xét tác động của kinh nghiệm quốc tế của CEO đến lượng tiền mặt nắm giữ của doanh nghiệp tại Việt Nam. CEO có kinh nghiệm quốc tế được định nghĩa là những cá nhân đã học tập và/hoặc làm việc ở nước ngoài trước khi trở về Việt Nam. Sử dụng dữ liệu của 538 doanh nghiệp niêm yết trên Sở Giao dịch Chứng khoán TP. Hồ Chí Minh (HOSE) và Sở Giao dịch Chứng khoán Hà Nội (HNX) trong giai đoạn 2013–2021, kết quả cho thấy mối quan hệ thuận chiều giữa kinh nghiệm quốc tế của CEO và tỷ lệ nắm giữ tiền mặt của doanh nghiệp. Cụ thể, các doanh nghiệp do CEO có trải nghiệm quốc tế lãnh đạo có xu hướng duy trì mức nắm giữ tiền mặt cao hơn so với các doanh nghiệp do CEO chỉ có kinh nghiệm trong nước điều hành. Những phát hiện này nhấn mạnh vai trò đáng kể của CEO có kinh nghiệm quốc tế trong việc định hình chính sách tài chính doanh nghiệp và đưa ra hàm ý thực tiễn quan trọng cho nhà quản trị và nhà đầu tư.

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Oct 31, 2025
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Huong, N. T. “Foreign-Experienced CEOs and Firm Cash Holdings”. Tạp Chí Khoa học Và Công nghệ - Đại học Đà Nẵng, vol 23, số p.h 10A, Tháng Mười 2025, tr 13-17, doi:10.31130/ud-jst.2025.23(10A).367E.

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